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EEC Competition Rules Apply to the Insurance 
Sector: V dS v. Commission 
Philippe De Smedt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984 the European Court of Justice rendered judgment in Verband der 
Sachversicherer v. Commission.' As the direct result of this judgment, a "trade" 
association which represents the interests of insurers may infringe upon the 
competitive rules of Article 85(1) of the EEC Treaty2 by recommending or 
requiring that its members uniformly increase their premiums. In terms of its 
historical and practical significance, however, V dS stands for a much broader 
proposition: it would appear that the insurance sector as a whole is now subject 
to the EEC rules of competition, in particular Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
of Rome.3 
Within the context of the specific situation confronting the court, this article 
will demonstrate that the VdS judgment should have a major impact on insur-
ance companies and other insurance-related undertakings doing business in the 
EEC. 
II. THE FACTS 
This procedure stemmed from certain activities of Verband der Sachversi-
cherer (V dS), a Cologne-based association which represented the interests of 
property insurers, including those providing fire and consequential loss cover-
age, which are authorized to do business in West Germany. 
To be more precise, the controversy in VdS centered on one of the VdS 
"special committees." It appeared that VdS established, in addition to its three 
organs (membership section, board of directors, and director), special commit-
tees pertaining to the various kinds of property insurance represented in the 
• Mr. De Smedt practices EEC law in Brussels and is a partner with Lebrun, De Smedt &: Dassesse. 
I Case 45/85, Judgment of January 27, 1984 (not yet published). Any references to the court 
judgment herein are to the official French translation, whereas any reference to the Conclusions of 
Advocate General Darmon are to the original French text. 
• Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community done at Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 
V.N.T.S. 3, art. 85 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
3 /d. at arts. 85 and 86. 
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membership. One of these special committees, representing the interests of 
members providing fire and consequential loss coverage, "recommended" pre-
mium increases for V dS members providing such coverage. This price recom-
mendation, which was approved by the V dS board of directors, provided for 
uniform premium increases of 10 per cent, 20 per cent, or 30 per cent, de-
pending on the circumstances. This recommendation went into full effect in 
August 1980 and the Commission was notified two years later. By a decision 
taken on December 5, 1984, the Commission determined that the recommen-
dation amounted to a "decision" by an association of undertakings which in-
fringed Article 85( 1) of the EEC Treaty and refused to grant a negative clear-
ance or an exemption under Article 85(3).4 VdS then sought to annul this 
decision in the European Court of Justice on the basis of Article 173.5 
III. LEGAL DISCUSSION 
The application of VdS to the court raised six grounds for annulment: (1) 
that the EEC competition rules do not apply in the sector of insurance; (2) that 
the Commission is not competent to intervene in the economic policy of a 
member state; (3) that the disputed recommendation did not constitute a "de-
cision" of an association of undertakings; (4) that the disputed recommendation 
had neither the object nor effect of restricting competition; (5) that trade 
between member states would not be affected by the recommendation; and (6) 
that the Commission wrongfully refused an exemption under Article 85(3). 
A. Application of the EEC Competition Rules to the Insurance Sector 
The first and primary argument of VdS began with the assumption that the 
EEC competition rules (Articles 85 et seq.) do, in principle, apply to the insurance 
field. It was asserted, however, that the application of this Article, "sans restric-
tions ou reserves," could not take place until or unless the Council of Ministers, 
pursuant to Article 87(2)(c),6 had determined the particular aspects of the 
insurance sector which were subject to the EEC competition rules. In this 
particular factual and legal context, the applicant was arguing that Article 85 
(l) could not be enforced without prior Council approval. It was not disputed 
that the Council had not taken action under Article 87(2)(c) bringing the in-
surance sector within the ambit of the EEC competition rules. 
In making this argument, V dS was suggesting a novel reading of Article 
87(2)(c), which merely provides that any regulations or directives adopted by 
the Council which gives effect to Articles 85 and 86 shall be designed "(c) to 
4 [d. at art. 85. 
5 [d. at art. 173. 
6 [d. at art. 87. 
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define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of the 
provisions of Article 85 and 86 .... " VdS did not appear to dispute that Article 
87(2)(c) does not, on its face, compel the Council to expressly determine each 
activity to which the EEC competition rules would apply. Rather, V dS contended 
that Article 87(2)(c) imposed an obligation on the Council to temper the restric-
tions of the EEC competition rules to the extent necessary to guarantee the 
survival of certain kinds of economic activity. 
VdS maintained that the insurance sector was an area of economic activity 
protected from the application of the EEC competition rules in the absence of 
Council action under Article 87(2)(c). VdS posited that, if Articles 85 and 86 
were to apply to the insurance field without qualification, its financial security 
as an industry could be seriously endangered. As evidence of this proposition, 
VdS explained that insurance contracts contain a risk factor which is not present 
in other kinds of agreements. In addition, VdS noted, fluctuations in the prob-
ability of certain kinds of losses, such as fire, require insurers to collaborate in 
determining necessary reserves and fiscal planning. To further demonstrate its 
position, VdS pointed out that in West Germany, Article 102 of the Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewebsbeschrankungen (GGW), the national antitrust provision 
which prohibited agreements and decisions restricting competition, was not 
applicable to insurance industry practices already under the supervision and 
surveillance of the federal office governing insurance matters. 
The court quickly disposed of VdS's contentions. First, the court relied on its 
recent judgment in Ministere Public v. Asjes7 in which the court had said that 
"where the Treaty intended to remove certain activities from the ambit of the 
competition rules, it made an express derogation to that effect."8 The court 
pointed out that such derogation had been made with respect to the production 
and trade of agricultural products under Article 429 but not, however, in the 
field of insurance. 
Secondly, the court dismissed the interpretation given to Article 87 by VdS, 
noting that Article 87 did not compel the Council to spell out each and every 
mode of application of Article 85 and 86. Rather, Article 87 was intended to 
provide the Council with an opportunity to exclude, in whole or in part, the 
application of Articles 85 and 86 to specific economic activities "if need be." 
The court observed that the Council had already excluded certain modes of 
transportation from the operation of Regulation 17/62 but had not taken action 
with respect to insurance. Accordingly, the broad conclusion reached by the 
court was that the EEC competition rules, in particular Articles 85 and 86 and 
Regulation 17/62, are fully applicable to the insurance sector. 
7 Case 209-213/84, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 173 (1986). 
'3 Common Mkt. L.R. 215 (1986). 
9 EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 42. 
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This first submission of V dS dealing with whether the insurance sector is 
covered by the EEC competition rules was not an entirely new one for the court. 
Advocate General Darmon pointed out in his Conclusions that the court had 
already decided in Van Ameyde v. Ufficio Centrale lO that the national bureaus for 
automobile insurance are subject to Articles 85 and 86. 
In Van Ameyde, a case referred to the court under Article 177, the court was 
confronted with a number of questions involving the application in Italy of the 
so-called "green card" system. I I As the result of this system, an injured party in 
an accident could report the accident to a "national bureau" (an association of 
auto insurance undertakings) established in his member state, which would then 
seek indemnification from the "sister" bureau established in the member state 
of the foreign driver. One of the questions submitted to the court for prelimi-
nary ruling related directly to the practices of the national bureau in Italy which 
participated in this system. The question was whether an agreement or con-
certed practice among the members of the national bureau, or the decision of 
the bureau itself, could establish that the national bureau assumes sole respon-
sibility for the settlement of claims for damage caused in the territory of that 
member state by vehicles insured by foreign insurance companies, and exclude 
from membership those undertakings which are engaged solely in the negoti-
ation of such settlements. The court held as follows: 
A decision or a course of conduct of a national bureau or concerted 
practices of its members which have the object or effect of excluding 
undertakings whose business consists solely in the settlement (in the 
sense referred to above), of accident claims on behalf of insurers, 
may possibly fall under the prohibition of Article 85 and, if the 
national bureau is in a dominant position, under the prohibition of 
Article 90 of the Treaty in conjunction with Article 86. 12 
One could argue that the court in Van Ameyde had already decided that the 
insurance sector is subject to the EEC competition rules, leaving to VdS the 
more sublime question whether Article 87(2)(c) might justify an exclusion of 
the insurance industry from the application of the EEC rules. It would appear, 
however, that neither of the above interpretations are accurate and that, in fact, 
the court intended V dS to play the determining role in subjecting the insurance 
industry to the EEC competition rules. First, the court's judgment in Van Ameyde 
was expressly limited, undoubtedly as the result of the Article 177 reference, 
to the issue whether the acts in question of the national bureaus violated Article 
10 Case 90/76, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1091,2 Common Mkt. L.R. 478 (1977). 
II This system allows drivers from one member state to travel to other member states without 
requiring the purchase of insurance in the country visited, nor presenting a risk of impoundment of 
the vehicle in the event of an accident on foreign soil. 
I. 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1126, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 505 (1977). 
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85(1). There is no language in Van Ameyde broadly subjecting the industry as a 
whole to the EEC competition scheme. This interpretation is supported by 
Advocate General Darmon who, as we suggested above, read Van Ameyde in its 
narrow factual context. On the other hand, the court in VdS very lucidly uses 
the occasion to extend the application of the EEC competition rules to the entire 
insurance industry. This interpretation is suggested not only by the plain lan-
guage of the judgment but also by its procedural context. In seeking an annul-
ment of the Commission decision, VdS mounted an aggressive attack on the 
very proposition that the EEC competition rules applied to the insurance in-
dustry. These circumstances gave the court an opportunity to answer disposi-
tively, in the affirmative, the question whether the insurance industry was subject 
to the competition rules. 
The court's response to the Article 87(2)(c) argument in VdS was critical to 
the ultimate result achieved. The court's reasoning closely followed that of 
Advocate General Darmon. Mr. Darmon had argued, firstly, that the field of 
application of Article 85 and 86 did not depend on the prior delineation of the 
Council; rather, Article 87(2)(c) leaves to the Council discretionary power to set 
limits on the application of Articles 85 and 86, "Ie cas echeant."13 Secondly, 
added Darmon, even if Article 87(2)(c) compelled the Council to take action 
delineating the field of application of Article 85 and 86, the application of these 
two Articles, which the court had deemed to be immediate and direct, could 
not be suspended pending such Council action. Darmon therefore concluded 
here that measures taken under Article 87(2)(c) only facilitated the application 
of Articles 85 and 86 and were not intended to amount to prerequisites to the 
application of these two Articles. Finally, Mr. Darmon disagreed with VdS's 
argument that the insurance sector deserved relief from EEC antitrust enforce-
ment, as shown by the favorable West German legislation, and that, therefore, 
this sector was protected from the application of Article 87(2)(c). Here, Darmon 
observed that the West German legislation in question, far from being consistent 
with Article 85(1), was actually in contradiction of the Treaty objectives of the 
unification of the Common Market and the free movement of goods. Quoting 
from Commission v. Italy,14 Darmon stated that if Articles 85 and 86 could be 
subordinated to conflicting national legislation, the foregoing two Treaty objec-
tives would lose their meaning. 15 
The court's discussion of Article 87(2)(c), as amplified by the Conclusions of 
Advocate General Darmon, shows that the repercussions of VdS extend far 
I' Case 45/85, supra note 1, Conclusions of Advocate General Darmon, at 13. 
14 Case 193/80, Recueil, at 3019, point 17 (not published) ("Le principe fondamental d'unite de 
marche et son corollaire, la libre circulation des marchandises, ne sauraient-en toutes circonstances--
etre subordonne it la condition prealable du rapprochement des legislations nationales, car une telle 
sujetion obligatoire viderait ce principe de son contenu.") 
15 Case 45/85, supra note I, Conclusions of Advocate General Darmon, at 15. 
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beyond the insurance sector. In short, V dS reaffirms the direct effect of the 
EEC competition rules and their supremacy over conflicting state laws. 
B. Interference in the Economic Policy of a Member State 
In its second argument, VdS posited that Article 85(1) of the Treaty applies 
only to individuals and undertakings and was not intended to interfere with or 
nullify the economic policies of any of the member states. VdS argued that the 
West German government had implemented a coherent economic policy appli-
cable to the insurance industry, as evidenced by the governmental supervision 
of the industry and by the derogation from Article 102 of the GGW, which 
derogation allegedly permitted undertakings operating in West Germany to 
partition the national market. VdS maintained that this national economic 
scheme could not be compromised by the application of Article 85(1). 
Addressing this second submission, the court observed preliminarily that the 
Commission's censure of the V dS recommendation could not have had any 
inhibitory effects on the alleged economic policy of West Germany because the 
Commission action concerned an agreement in the private sector to fix the 
prices of services. The court appeared to suggest that the alleged economic 
policy, to the extent that it may have actually existed, did not include or envision 
government-sanctioned price fixing. 
The court further noted that the West German regime of supervision in the 
insurance sector was not implemented to attain objectives similar to those of the 
EEC competition rules, and that, consequently, the functioning of this govern-
mental regime could not be affected by any application of the EEC competition 
rules in the insurance sector. In any case, the court added, the applicant failed 
to prove that the application of Article 85 (1) in the instant controversy would 
interfere with the functioning of the alleged economic policy. 
Finally, the court pointed out that if the economic policy asserted by V dS did, 
in fact, conflict with the EEC competition rules, there could be no doubt that 
the national policy would be subordinated to Community law. For each of the 
foregoing reasons, the court rejected VdS's second submission. 
Advocate General Darmon pointed out that the subordination of the state 
economic policy to the EEC competition rules was compelled by the previous 
judgment of the court in Walt Wilhelm,16 in which the court had said: 
The EEC Treaty has established its own system of law, integrated 
into the legal systems of the Member States, and which must be 
applied by their courts. It would be contrary to the nature of such 
a system to allow Member States to introduce or to retain measures 
16 Case 14/68, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1,8 Common Mkt. L.R. 100 (1969). 
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capable of prejudicing the practical effectiveness of the Treaty. The 
binding force of the Treaty and of measures taken in application 
of it must not differ from one state to another as the result of 
internal measures, lest the functioning of the Community system 
should be impeded and the achievements of the aims of the Treaty 
placed in peril. Consequently, conflicts between the rules of the 
Community and national rules in the matter of the law on cartels 
must be resolved by applying the principle that Community law 
takes precedence. 17 
81 
In VdS, the state economic policy asserted by the applicant had been embodied 
in particular legislation. Thus, it was clear that the policy had itself become an 
"internal act" or "national rule" within the meaning of Wilhelm. It follows, 
therefore, that the court in VdS did not need to extend its jurisprudence beyond 
that of Wilhelm or Commission v. Italy in order to decide that a state "economic 
policy" is subordinated to the EEC competition rules. It would appear, more-
over, that even if the economic policy asserted by the applicant had not consti-
tuted a legislative or judicial act, the argument would appear even stronger that 
such a policy is subordinated to the EEC competition rules, as governmental 
policies, strictly speaking, are not enforceable rules of law which conflict in a 
legal sense with mandatory EEC rules. 
C. The Non-Obligatory Nature of the Recommendation 
In its third argument, V dS maintained that the recommendation at issue did 
not constitute a "decision" within the meaning of Article 85 (1). VdS alleged 
three grounds in support of this position: (1) the recommendation was non-
obligatory as to the VdS members concerned, as evidenced by the denomination 
of the measure as a "recommendation"; (2) the special committee for fire 
insurers was authorized by V dS to study technical questions and not to make 
decisions which were to bind either its committee members or the association 
as a whole; and (3) only the membership section of VdS or its board of directors 
were competent to make decisions which were binding on any of the V dS 
members, and neither of these two organs had adopted the recommendation 
in question. The response of the court was threefold and closely followed the 
Conclusions of Advocate General Darmon. 
First, the court observed preliminarily that V dS did not contest that the 
insurer members of VdS had an "interet commun" in stabilizing the market 
with an increase in premiums. IS Evidently, this interest was particularly strong 
in the case of fire insurers, which had suffered a considerable decrease in 
17 1969 E. Comm. Ct.]. Rep. at 14. 
18 Case 45/85, supra note 1, Judgment, at 13. 
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premiums between 1973 and 1980. As the Commission decision noted, however, 
in a point which was not disputed by VdS, the insurers did not react individually 
to this fall in premiums because they were accustomed to acting as groups of 
insurers or as represented by V dS. 
It was also clear to the court that the denomination of the measure as a 
"recommendation" was not controlling as to its true character. Examining the 
substance of the recommendation, the court found that it prescribed in imper-
ative terms a collective linear increase in premiums. The court cited as further 
evidence of the obligatory character of the recommendation the fact that reas-
surers had decided collectively, after receiving the V dS recommendation, to 
include in their contracts of reassurance a special clause for the calculation of 
premiums which would effectively increase the premiums when in the case of 
an accident insurance coverage was insufficient. 
Finally, in response to V dS's argument as to the lack of authority of the special 
committee concerned and the failure of V dS to adopt the recommendation, the 
court made three points: (1) that the bylaws of VdS empowered VdS to coor-
dinate the activities of its members, particularly in the antitrust area; (2) contrary 
to VdS's assertion, the special committee for fire insurers was established for 
the very purpose of coordinating the tariff policies of its members; and (3) that 
decisions and recommendations of this special committee became binding on 
its members when approved by the board of directors. 
These elements led the court to conclude that the recommendation amounted 
to an imperative issued by the applicant, which was both authorized by VdS's 
bylaws and binding on its recipients. Therefore, the third submission of VdS 
was rejected. In its response to the third submission, the court virtually adopted 
the conclusions of Advocate General Darmon, who in turn relied heavily on the 
conclusions of Advocate General Mayras in VCH v. Commission. 19 
In VCH the court had found that the cement dealer's association of the 
Netherlands, Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren (VCH), had violated Article 
85( 1) of the Treaty by recommending prices to its members for deliveries of 
cement exceeding one hundred tons. Advocate General Mayras concisely ex-
plained the difference between the "decision" of an association and an "agree-
ment" between undertakings as follows: "Decisions by association of undertak-
ings differ from simple agreements in that, by belonging to the association, 
traders, whether they are natural or legal persons, accept its constitution and 
its discipline and are bound by the majority decisions adopted by the advisory 
or executive organs of the association."20 In VCH, the facts revealed that the 
board of directors, elected by the VCH members, was authorized to make 
19 Case 8/72, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 977, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 7 (1973). 
20 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 998. 
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decisions which were binding on the members, particularly in the area of prices. 
Compliance with these decisions was ensured by disciplinary measures, includ-
ing expulsion from the association. On this basis, Advocate General Mayras 
concluded that decisions of VCH were of a binding nature "the implementation 
of which is ensured by means of a disciplinary system, internal to the associa-
tion."21 In respect to VCH's argument that the recommended prices were not 
compulsory and therefore not binding and unable to impair competition, Ad-
vocate General Mayras stated the following: 
First of all, the target prices, although they differ from minimum 
standard prices, are on that account no less binding on all the 
members of the association and, by preventing them from them-
selves determining their own selling prices completely indepen-
dently, limit their commercial freedom no less. They are prices fixed 
by a binding majority decision; in this respect the trade rules in 
question certainly come within the field of application of Article 
85(1)(a) which refers expressly to cartels which "directly or indirectly 
fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions."22 
The court in VCH fully agreed with the conclusion of Advocate General 
Mayras that recommended prices become binding on the association through 
the internal system of sanctions: 
If a system [which] imposed selling prices is clearly in conflict with 
that provision (Article 85(1», the system of "target prices" is equally 
so .... In fact the fixing of a price, even one which merely constitutes 
a target, affects competition because it enables all the participants 
to predict with a reasonable degree of certainty what the pricing 
policy pursued by their competitors will be ... and those provisions 
must in addition be considered within the framework of the internal rules of 
the applicant association as a whole which are characterized by strict disci-
pline in conjunction with inspections and penalties. 23 
In VdS, the court was less methodical than it was in VCH in that it failed to 
make the necessary linkage of the recommended premium increases to the 
potential imposition of sanctions by the association. This seems to have been an 
oversight, however, rather than the reflection of a conscious change in the 
court's position due to the fact that the court was obviously adopting the Con-
clusions of Advocate General Darmon, who himself incorporated the reasoning 
of VCH. And, it should be added, that Advocate General Darmon did not 
overlook the aspect of sanctions, as he noted that Article 3, paragraph 5(b) of 
21 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 998, II Common Mkt. L.R. at 15. 
22 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 999, II Common Mkt. L.R. at 17 (emphasis added). 
23 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 989-90, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. at 22 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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the VdS by-laws empowered the board of directors to expel those members 
who were guilty of serious or repeated breaches of the by-laws or "un com-
portement manifestement contraire aux interc~ts du groupement."24 
D. The Object or Effect of Restricting Competition 
In this fourth submission, VdS attempted to refute the finding of the Com-
mission that the recommendation had the "object" of restricting competition. 
VdS set forth in essence a two-part argument. First, the recommendation was 
solely a manifestation of cooperation in the insurance sector, which was both 
necessary and customary due to the element of risk which is inherent in this 
industry. Second, even if the recommendation had the object of restricting 
competition, it could not have had this "effect" because the recommendation 
would not have been put into practice by the members concerned. 
Addressing the first part of VdS's argument, the court stated that by means 
of the recommendation V dS sought to achieve a collective linear increase in 
premiums. In short, the manifest object of the recommendation was to fix the 
price of services offered by the V dS members. The court reminded V dS that a 
decision by an association infringes Article 85( 1)(a) if it has the object of "directly 
or indirectly fix[ing] purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions." 
Since the V dS recommendation had this object, the court concluded that it was 
unnecessary to consider whether the recommendation had an additional or 
alternative purpose. 
Having concluded that the VdS recommendation had an illegal "object," the 
court concluded that there was no reason to consider whether the recommen-
dation also had an anti-competitive "effect." Here, VdS had ignored the well-
established jurisprudence of the court, which had consistently held that the 
"object or effect" clause of Article 85 (1) must be read disjunctively. In other 
words, if the conduct involved satisfies the "object" test, its effect need not be 
examined. Thus, it is only when an illegal object cannot be found that it becomes 
necessary to analyze the anti-competitive effects of an agreement, decision, or 
concerted practice. For the above reasons, the court rejected this fourth sub-
mission. 
When one considers the superficiality of the two arguments asserted by VdS, 
it is clear that the court correctly dealt with this submission. VdS's first argument 
was that the recommendation did not have the object of restricting competition, 
but rather was a necessary manifestation of cooperation in the insurance in-
dustry. In short, VdS did not deny that the desired result of the recommen-
dation was to produce a collective, linear increase in premiums, but rather 
defended its "motive" for issuing the recommendation. Here, the court was 
24 Case 45/85, supra note I, Conclusions of Advocate General Darmon, at 28. 
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correct In focusing on what the recommendation was intended to produce or 
suppress rather than on why the recommendation was circulated. This approach 
was recently reflected in BNIC v. Clair25 in which the court held: 
By its very nature, an agreement fixing a minimum price for a product 
which is submitted to the public authorities for the purpose of 
obtaining approval for that minimum price, so that it becomes bind-
ing on all traders on the market in question, is intended to distort 
competition on that market.26 
This logic was also shown in FEDETAB v. Commission,27 in which the court said, 
"Article 85 (1) also applies to associations in so far as their own activities or 
those of the undertakings belonging to them are calculated to produce the 
results which it aims to suppress."28 Perhaps most cogent of all is the viewpoint 
of Advocate General Mayras in VCH, who stated: 
I think that in this case the very existence of rules to which penalties 
are attached and which aim to organize the market in cement by 
enclosing traders in a tight and closely-knit network of provisions 
which not only relate to prices but also to the conditions of sale and 
delivery sufficiently reveals the aim pursued by VCH.29 
VdS's second argument, which was equally transparent, was that VdS did not 
infringe Article 85 (1) because the recommendation did not have an anti-
competitive effect. Here, VdS had overlooked the long-established rule of Con-
sten and Grundig v. Commission30 in which the court held that the "object or effect" 
clause of Article 85 (1) contains disjunctive requirements.3l Though the de 
minimis rule of Viilk v. Vervaeke32 compels the investigation of the intended effects 
of the recommendation, it is now pretty much axiomatic that a decision to fix 
prices, which is listed under Article 85 (1) at the first example of an infringe-
ment, would amount almost always to a case of infringement.33 
25 Case 123/83. 1985 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 391. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 134 (1985). 
26 1985 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 423-24. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. at 39 (1985). 
27 Case 209-215178 & 218178. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125. 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 134 (1981). 
28 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3250. 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 225 (1980). 
29 Case 8172. 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1000.3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 17 (1973). 
30 Case 56 & 58/64. 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 418 (1966). 
31 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 342. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 470 (1966). 
32 Case 5/69. 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295. 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 273 (1969). 
" Several commentators have noted the following: 
[P]rice-fixing agreements between undertakings in the same member state may fall within 
Article 85( 1) even if they do not expressly apply to imports or exports between member 
states. Ordinarily. such an agreement will fall within Article 85(1) if its effect is to contribute 
to the continuing isolation of the national market by making it more difficult for suppliers in 
other member states to penetrate that market. In particular. a restrictive agreement extending 
over the whole of the territory of a member state "is by its very nature liable to have the 
effect of reinforcing the compartmentalization of markets. on a national basis. thereby holding 
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E. The Effect on Trade between Member States 
In its fifth submission, V dS contested the finding of the Commission that the 
recommendation may affect trade between member states. V dS argued that 
such a trans-national effect in trade did not exist because performance of 
insurance services outside of West Germany was allegedly prohibited by national 
legislation, which required foreign insurers wishing to operate in West Germany 
to establish a local branch office. Furthermore, in the view of VdS, the affairs 
of these branch offices could not be attributed to the foreign headquarters 
because the branches were "unites economiques autonomes."34 In any case, 
argued V dS, the recommendation concerned only national situations; foreign-
based insurers were not affected by the VdS measure. 
The court observed, at the outset, that the West German legislation cited by 
VdS only required foreign insurers to establish branch offices in West Germany. 
The national law did not forbid these branch offices from performing services 
in other member states. Moreover the court said, even if it were assumed that 
the branch office were "independent" of the foreign headquarters, the V dS 
recommendation was capable of affecting the financial relations between the 
branch office and the foreign headquarters. By this, the court appeared to 
suggest that the economic ties between a parent company and its subsidiary or 
branch office in another member state would be sufficient to affect trade be-
tween member states. Moreover, the court noted that the recommendation of 
linear increases in premiums could potentially have an effect on foreign insurers 
which are able to offer services in West Germany at more competitive prices 
than those set forth in the recommendation but which are discouraged by the 
recommendation from establishing local branch offices. 
In this fifth submission, the court visibly adopted much of the thinking of 
Advocate General Darmon whose analysis was trenchant and thorough. Advo-
cate General Darmon's discussion began with a recitation of the scope of the 
"effect on trade" element of Article 85( 1), which, not surprisingly, is quite broad. 
Advocate General Darmon stated: 
For this requirement to be fulfilled, it must be possible to foresee 
with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective 
factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have 
an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern 
of trade between Member States .... [I]t is necessary to consider in 
particular whether it is capable of bringing about a partitioning of the 
up the economic interpenetration which the Treaty is designed to bring about and protecting 
domestic production." 
C. BELAMY & G. CHILDS, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 76 (2d ed., 1978). See also KORAH, 
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE To EEC COMPETITION LAW 62 (3rd ed., 1986) . 
.. Case 45/85, supra note I, Judgment, at 18. 
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market in certain products between Member States and thus render-
ing more difficult the interpenetration of trade which the Treaty is 
intended to create.35 
87 
The liberality of this test led Advocate General Darmon to posit that this 
condition is satisfied each time that there is a risk of contradiction between the 
envisaged agreement and the economic objectives of the Treaty. 
In VdS, there was no doubt for Advocate General Darmon that the recom-
mendation was capable of affecting trade between member states. First, he 
pointed out that the relevant West German legislation did not prohibit insurance 
contracts across the national frontier. Second, he noted that a branch office 
established in West Germany and its foreign parent company constituted a 
single economic entity with the result that even "national" business conducted 
by the West German branches would have a transnational effect. In support of 
this conclusion, Advocate General Darmon observed that the West German 
legislation itself provided that the branches to be established in West Germany 
would be obliged to satisfy administrative and fiscal requirements enabling West 
German assureds to file claims locally rather than with the foreign home office. 
The lack of autonomy between the parent and branch office was also manifested 
by the fact that the branch offices could transfer both their profits and losses 
to the home office. Finally, Advocate General Darmon noted that even apart 
from the evidence of dependency between the home office and the foreign 
branch, it was beyond doubt that a recommendation to increase premiums 
would, in and of itself, have an effect on trade between member states. For this 
proposition, Advocate General Darmon cited the recently decided SSI 
judgment36 in which the court held that a price-fixing agreement between 
undertakings established in one member state which does not expressly apply 
to sales between member states will, nonetheless, affect trade between member 
states. As applied to VdS, foreign insurers without a strong reputation in West 
Germany may have difficulty selling insurance in West Germany at the prices 
stated in the VdS recommendation. The recommendation may, therefore, dis-
courage trade between member states. 
F. The Application of Article 85(3) 
In its final argument, V dS contended that the Commission erred in refusing 
to grant VdS an individual exemption under Article 85(3) and that VdS had 
satisfied all of the conditions for granting the exemption. The principle argu-
ment of VdS was that the recommendation was necessary to reestablish the 
35 Case 56165, see Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Dim, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 
249,3 Common Mkt. L.R. 357 (1966). 
36 Case 240-42, 261-62, 268-69/82, Judgment of December 10, 1985. 
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profitability of insurers while safeguarding the interests of the assureds. Thus, 
VdS reinforced the position that it maintained when it sought the exemption, 
which, at the time, was that the recommendation contributed to an improvement 
in the performance of services by insurers. 
Before confronting V dS's position, the court observed preliminarily that the 
objective of the Commission in evaluating whether VdS satisfied the criteria of 
Article 85(3) was to determine whether the recommendation contributed to the 
improvement of services in the insurance sector. This determination involved a 
three-part test: (1) whether the recommendation had the object of confronting 
real problems in the insurance sector which resulted from the steady fall in 
premiums collected by fire insurers; (2) whether the recommendation was ap-
propriate for confronting such problems; and (3) whether the means employed 
(i.e. the premium increases) exceeded what was necessary to accomplish the 
object of the recommendation. 
For purposes of the application of VdS, the court found that the only real 
issue under Article 85(3) was whether V dS satisfied the third point of the above-
mentioned test. Thus, assuming the acceptable goal of stabilizing the insurance 
sector and the appropriateness of the measure (i.e., recommending an increase 
in premium), the question was whether the collective, linear increase in pre-
miums exceeded what was necessary to accomplish such an objective. In this 
regard, it was the view of the court that the measure taken by VdS was excessive. 
First, the court observed that the increase in premiums encompassed not only 
direct costs resulting from losses suffered by the assureds, but also the admin-
istrative expenses of the insurer, which differed from one insurance company 
to another. Thus, in compelling a global increase in premiums which failed to 
account for the individual financial needs of its members, V dS was taking action 
which exceeded what was necessary to accomplish its professed goal. Conse-
quently, the court said that the advantages of the means selected by V dS were 
outweighed by its disadvantages from the viewpoint of the EEC competition 
rules. On the above stated grounds, the court rejected this sixth submission. 
In addressing the sixth submission of V dS, the sole object of the court, in its 
judicial review, was to conduct "an examination of the relevance of the facts 
and of the legal consequences which the Commission deduces therefrom."37 
The only issue taken up by the court was whether the Commission was correct 
in determining that VdS adopted means exceeding what was necessary to sta-
bilize the sector of fire and consequential loss insurers. Though the court agreed 
with the Commission's assessment that the recommendation exceeded what was 
reasonable because it included profit, the court's conclusion should be viewed 
in a wider perspective. For purposes of future agreements and decisions of 
37 Case 56-58/64, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 347,3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 478 (1966). 
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associations in the insurance sector, it would appear that premium-fixing may 
be tolerated under Article 85(3) to the extent that the specific measure employed 
does not exceed what is necessary to stabilize the market in the insurance sub-
sector involved; in other words, that only costs directly related to insured losses 
be recouped. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This comment has attempted to show that the VdS judgment concerns not 
only insurance-related issues but also several interesting questions relating to 
"decisions" of associations to recommend uniform prices. From the viewpoint 
of the insurance industry, the impact of VdS is considerable. Efforts of insurance 
associations to bolster the fortunes of financially precarious sub-sectors by means 
of premium increases must now assess the likelihood of obtaining an exemption 
under Article 85(3). Theoretically, this may not appear to represent a potential 
threat to the industry as long as the collective increase is designed to recoup 
the monies paid out for insured losses. But, practically speaking, the court's 
judgment is likely to discourage even the collective increases which would satisfy 
Article 85(3) under the court's formula. The reason for this is simple. If the 
sub-sector of the industry involved is already in the midst of a financial crisis, 
there is little that an exemption, granted two or three years after the application 
is made, may be able to accomplish. During the waiting period, the industry is 
likely to turn to alternative forms of raising capital, such as acquisitions and 
mergers. In the long run, competition could be seriously weakened. 
With respect to its interpretation of Article 85(1), VdS provides several new 
insights into the meaning of a binding "decision." First, it was shown that a 
decision is binding on its members, not only by virtue of its adoption by the 
members, but also as a result of potential sanctions imposed by the association. 
Moreover, it was shown that a decision to "recommend" prices may amount to 
the substantive equivalent of a decision to fix mandatory prices if the recom-
mendation may be internally enforced by disciplinary measures. These rules 
affect not only the insurance sector but all professional associations operating 
in the EEC which are empowered to make binding resolutions on behalf of 
their members. In terms of its long-term value, therefore, VdS should be note-
worthy for its contribution to the interpretive literature on Article 85(1). 
